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Abstract: The standard time-inconsistency-based explanation for the negative correlation
between openness and inflation requires an inverse relationship between the sacrifice ratio and
openness, but Daniels et al. (2005, Openness, central bank independence, and the sacrifice
ratio. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 37 (2), 371-379.) have provided evidence that
controlling for central bank independence reveals a positive relationship. This paper embeds the
time-inconsistency approach within a model of a multisector, imperfectly competitive, open
economy. In this setting, greater openness raises the sacrifice ratio but reduces the inflation
bias. Thus, failure to observe an inverse relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio
does not necessarily imply that the time-inconsistency approach is irrelevant to understanding
the openness-inflation relationship.

1. Introduction
Traditional explanations concerning the documented inverse relationship between
openness and trend inflation rely on the idea that increased openness worsens the terms of the
output-inflation trade-off and thereby reduces the incentive for a monetary authority to engage in
discretionary policies that boost the mean inflation rate. Romer (1993) argues that greater
openness effectively steepens the Phillips curve by exposing a nation to a larger negative
terms-of-trade effect generated by an expansion of domestic output. This explanation arguably
applies mainly to nations sufficiently large to influence international relative prices, so Lane
(1997) focuses on how greater openness reduces the potential output gains from unexpected
inflation in non-traded-goods sectors with imperfectly competitive goods markets and sticky
prices.
Nevertheless, Temple's (2002) cross-country analysis of sacrifice ratios-ratios of the
national output losses to corresponding reductions in inflation rates (see Ball, 1994 )-provides
meager support for the view that a worsened output-inflation trade-off accounts for the inverse
relationship between openness and inflation. This has led Temple to suggest that it may be
appropriate to consider rejecting the time-inconsistency approach as an explanation for the
openness-inflation relationship. He specifically suggests considering an alternative framework
that emphasizes inflation's role in influencing the costs that exchange-rate volatility imposes in
more open economies.
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While his suggestion certainly is an avenue worthy of further exploration, recent work by
Gruben and McLeod (2002, 2004) indicates that the time-inconsistency approach remains a
potentially fruitful explanation of the openness-inflation relationship. Whereas Gruben and
McLeod suggest that greater capital-markets openness may act as a policy commitment
mechanism that yields lower average inflation, in this paper we follow Lane (1997) and, more
broadly, the new open economy macroeconomics literature [see, for instance, Sarno, 2000,
2001; Obstfeld, 2001; Lane, 2001; VanHoose, 2004] by emphasizing real-sector factors
influencing central bank incentives.
Specifically, we examine a model in which imperfect competition and incomplete wage
rigidity are important characteristics of open economies. We incorporate the assumptions of
economy-wide monopolistic competition and partial nominal wage contracting into a textbook
one-shot-policy-game framework that allows us to examine essential features of the openness inflation relationship. In contrast to Lane (1997), all sectors of the economy in our model are
populated with monopolistically competitive firms that sell imperfectly substitutable products to
both domestic and foreign consumers. Our use of this model allows us to demonstrate that the
time-inconsistency/discretionary-policy approach can be fully consistent with both (1) a
shallower output-inflation trade-off (that is, a larger sacrifice ratio, as suggested by empirical
evidence recently provided by Daniels et aI., 2005) and (2) a negative relationship between the
degree of openness and trend inflation. Thus, failure to find that greater openness steepens the
output-inflation trade-off in cross-country data is not sufficient grounds for abandoning the timeinconsistency theory as a basis for understanding the determinants of the openness-inflation
relationship. A positive correlation between the openness and the sacrifice ratio even in the
presence of an inverse relationship between openness and mean inflation is consistent with the
results of our analysis.
This conclusion rests on the following line of reasoning. In the standard Barro-Gordon
(1983) approach, a shallower output-inflation trade-off provides a greater incentive to engage in
unanticipated monetary expansions, so that the essential basis for explaining the opennessinflation relationship is, as emphasized by Temple, the effect of openness on the shape of the
output-inflation trade-off. The standard Barro-Gordon framework, however, is based on the
assumptions of pure competition and economy-wide nominal wage contracts, so the shape of
the output-inflation trade-off ultimately depends on the shape of the aggregate supply function.
In imperfectly competitive economies, however, firms set prices, so there is no aggregate supply
curve. Furthermore, when only a portion of firms in the economy use nominal wage contracts,
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variations in the extent of nominal wage rigidity in the economy affect the channels through
which openness influences macroeconomic variables. As a consequence, under imperfect
competition and incomplete wage rigidity there is a broadening of the factors that can affect the
nature of the output-inflation trade-off. Included among these factors are the interplay among
the share of firms with wage contracts, the substitutability of products, the real-exchange-rate
sensitivity of aggregate expenditures, and the degree of openness to international trade. These
factors together influence the pricing power available to firms and, therefore, the response of
inflation to changes in aggregate demand induced by monetary policy actions.
In the framework examined in this paper, increased openness contributes to reduced
pricing power of domestic firms. Hence, in an economy characterized by monopolistic
competition, there is a shallower output-inflation trade-off, so that the sacrifice ratio increases
when the economy becomes more open. At the same time, however, the reduction in firms'
pricing power induced by greater openness hampers the extent to which of any given monetary
expansion can boost output by producing unexpected price increases. As a consequence, even
though greater openness increases the sacrifice ratio, it also has the effect of reducing the trend
inflation rate arising from discretionary monetary policy.
Our analysis thereby indicates that relationships predicted by the standard timeinconsistency approach will not apply to nations with economic structures that fail to satisfy its
background assumptions of pure competition and economy-wide nominal contracting. This
implies that it may be problematical to draw inferences about the policy implications of
openness using cross-country data or from data pooled from a number of nations without
controlling for structural differences across countries. For instance, for nations in which
imperfect competition and mixed labor-market structures predominate, the time-inconsistency
theory may explain the openness-inflation relationship even if greater openness is associated
with a higher sacrifice ratio. In other nations with structures that more closely match the
background assumptions adopted by Romer (economy-wide pure competition, nominal wage
rigidities, and sufficient size to affect international relative prices) or Lane (perfectly substitutable
tradable goods but non-tradable goods sold in imperfectly competitive domestic markets with
sticky prices), the standard argument implying a lower sacrifice ratio would still apply. Across a
set of nations with mixed goods-market and labor-market structures, therefore, mixed empirical
results such as those obtained by Temple would not necessarily be surprising, nor particularly
puzzling.
To demonstrate these points, we develop a model that imbeds the basic Barro-Gordon
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discretionary-policy model imbedding imperfect competition as a key factor governing the
interplay among the economies of nations open to trade. We use a stylized framework that in
some respects is similar to the theoretical model developed by Karras (1999) in his panel study
of the relationship between openness and the effects of monetary policy on inflation and output
using data pooled from 38 countries. Our work is also analogous to earlier contributions by
Rogoff (1985), Hardouvelis (1992), and Rasmussen (1993) that have addressed the effects of
international trade and exchange rate regimes on discretionary monetary policy choices. In
contrast to these earlier contributions, however, in our open economy framework firms are
monopolistically competitive, and only a portion of firms use wage contracts.
Section 2 presents our model of an open economy containing monopolistically
competitive firms. Section 3 evaluates how changes in the extent of product substitutability and
the degree of openness jointly influence the output-inflation trade-off. In this section, we
demonstrate that a greater degree of product-market substitution and increased openness have
self-reinforcing effects that tend to increase the sacrifice ratio in an economy characterized by
monopolistic competition. In Section 4, we show that within such an economy, greater product
substitutability and increased openness nonetheless contribute to a decreased incentive for a
discretionary monetary authority to engage in inflationary monetary policies. Section 5
summarizes our conclusions.

2. An open, multisector economy with monopolistic competition
The theoretical framework incorporating monopolistic competition among atomistic firms
within a multi sector economy builds on the model developed in Duca and VanHoose (2000).
There are many sectors in the economy, indexed 𝑖𝑖, which are distributed uniformly along a unit

interval. Each sector contains large numbers of workers and firms. Identical firms within a sector
produce an identical good. This good is differentiated from the goods produced by firms in other
sectors. Following the earlier work of Ball (1988) and Duca and VanHoose, we assume for the
sake of both expositional simplicity and analytical tractability that the price elasticity of demand
is the same across sectors. Thus, goods are equally differentiated throughout the economy.
A fraction, 𝛺𝛺, of sectors contain workers and firms that use contracts to set nominal

wages in advance of labor-market clearing. Spot labor markets determine their nominal wages
in the remaining portion of sectors, 1 − 𝛺𝛺. In a closed-economy version of this basic framework,
Duca and VanHoose (2001) show that if risk-neutral firms and risk-averse workers face

common aggregate shocks and heterogeneously distributed sector-specific disturbances, the
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contract share of sectors, 𝛺𝛺, typically lies between zero and unity but declines as the variability
of sector-specific disturbances increases relative to the volatility of aggregate shocks. To
maintain tractability, we abstract from considerations of disturbances that influence the
endogenous determination of the contract share. Hence, we treat the contract share as an
exogenous parameter.
The output produced by a given firm in sector 𝑖𝑖 is given by
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 ,

(1)

where 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 is the log of output and 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖 is the log of employment at firm 𝑖𝑖. We could include a

productivity shock, but it would not influence trend inflation in the standard Barro-Gordon (1983)
discretionary-policy framework. We simplify, therefore, by assuming that any potential supplyand demand-side disturbances always equal zero ex post, hence we exclude explicit
consideration of such shocks from the analysis. The demand for the output of a domestic firm in
sector 𝑖𝑖 as a share of aggregate domestic output is
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦 = −𝜀𝜀(𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 − 𝑝𝑝),

1

(2)
1

where 𝑦𝑦 ≡ ∫0 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 d𝑖𝑖 is the log of aggregate domestic output, 𝑝𝑝 ≡ ∫0 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 d𝑖𝑖 is the log of the

aggregate domestic price level, and 𝜀𝜀 > 1 is the elasticity of demand for the output of firms in
sector 𝑖𝑖 of the domestic country.

The domestic nation's income-expenditure equilibrium condition (for a derivation of this

Cobb-Douglas approximation, see, for instance, Canzoneri and Henderson, 1991; or Bryson et
aI., 1993) is given by
𝑦𝑦 = 𝜂𝜂(𝑝𝑝∗ + 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑦𝑦 ∗,

(3)

where the home and foreign propensities to import, 𝛽𝛽 and 𝛽𝛽 ∗, are fractions; 𝜂𝜂 is the elasticity of

desired spending with respect to the real exchange rate; 𝑝𝑝∗ is the log of the aggregate foreign

price level; 𝑠𝑠 is the log of the foreign currency price of domestic currency; and 𝑦𝑦 ∗ is the log of
aggregate foreign output.

Domestic income is determined by the quantity equation,
𝑦𝑦 = 𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝,
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(4)

where we simplify by normalizing velocity at unity, so that the log of velocity equals zero.
Taking antilogs of Eqs. (1)-(4) and combining the resulting expressions with the profit
function, 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 − 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 , yields the labor demand function for a firm in sector 𝑖𝑖 (with the

intercept suppressed because it plays no role in our subsequent analysis):
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖d =

−𝜀𝜀(𝑤𝑤 𝑖𝑖 −𝑝𝑝)+𝜂𝜂(𝑝𝑝 ∗ +𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝)+(1−𝛽𝛽 )(𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝)+𝛽𝛽 ∗ 𝑦𝑦 ∗
,
𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼

(5)

where 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 is the log of the nominal wage at a firm in sector 𝑖𝑖, which we assume faces a perfectly

competitive labor market.

As in Ball (1988), within each sector the numerous firms face a pool of immobile workers.
Workers can consume both domestically produced output and foreign-produced goods.
Consequently, labor supply depends on the real wage computed in terms of the overall price
workers pay for a basket of both domestic and foreign goods:
𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖s = 𝜆𝜆[𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝 − 𝛽𝛽(𝑝𝑝∗ + 𝑠𝑠)],

(6)

where 𝜆𝜆 > 0. For sectors with or without nominal wage contracts, the full-information, market-

clearing wage satisfies Eqs. (5) and (6) simultaneously and equals

(𝑤𝑤_𝑖𝑖 ) ̂ = {[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)(1 − 𝛽𝛽) + 𝜀𝜀]𝑝𝑝 + 𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)𝛽𝛽(𝑝𝑝^ ∗ +𝑠𝑠) + 𝜂𝜂(𝑝𝑝^ ∗ +𝑠𝑠 −
𝑝𝑝) + (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝) + 𝛽𝛽^ ∗ 𝑦𝑦^ ∗ }/{[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) + 𝜀𝜀] }.

(7)

This is the wage actually paid by a firm in sector 𝑖𝑖 if its sector is among the share, 1 − 𝛺𝛺, of
sectors that do not use contracts.

Specifying analogous structural relationships for a foreign nation would yield a twocountry framework in which 𝑦𝑦 ∗ and 𝑝𝑝∗ would be endogenous variables. In this paper, however,
we assume the output and prices abroad are exogenously determined. Henceforth we simplify

the exposition by assuming that the foreign money stock, foreign price level, and foreign output
equal unity, so that 𝑚𝑚∗, 𝑝𝑝∗ , and 𝑦𝑦 ∗ equal zero.

Substitution of Eq. (7) into either Eq. (5) or Eq. (6) and the result into Eq. (1) yields the

output of a noncontract (nc) firm:
(𝜂𝜂−𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 )(𝑠𝑠−𝑝𝑝)(1−𝛽𝛽 )(𝑚𝑚−𝑝𝑝)
�.
[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )+𝜀𝜀]

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖nc = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 �
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(8)

∗e
At a contract firm, nominal wage contracts are set to satisfy𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖c = 𝑤𝑤�
𝑖𝑖 , where the superscript 𝑒𝑒

denotes the conditional expectation of a variable given information available in the previous
period. Substituting the result of Eq. (7) into Eq. (5) and Eq. (1) yields the output a firm in a
sector with a wage contract:

𝑦𝑦_𝑖𝑖^c = {𝛼𝛼{𝜀𝜀[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) + 𝜀𝜀](𝑝𝑝 − 𝑝𝑝^e ) + [𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) + 𝜀𝜀] × (1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝑚𝑚 − 𝑝𝑝) −
(1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝜀𝜀(𝑚𝑚^e − 𝑝𝑝^e ) + 𝜂𝜂[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) + 𝜀𝜀] × (𝑠𝑠 − 𝑝𝑝) } }/{[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) +

𝜀𝜀](𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) }.

(9)

Output of contracting firms, therefore, responds to unexpected price-level changes.
In Eqs. (8) and (9), the parameter 𝜂𝜂, which measures the sensitivity of expenditures on

domestic output in response to a change in the real exchange rate, naturally influences the

responsiveness of sectoral outputs to real-exchange-rate variations. The domestic propensity to
import, 𝛽𝛽, more broadly governs how sectoral outputs respond to both real-exchange-rate

variations and changes in domestic real money balances. This is so because the magnitude of
𝛽𝛽 plays two important roles in the model. First, together with the magnitude of 𝜂𝜂, the propensity

to import determines the relative importance of real-exchange-rate effects versus income effects
on total spending on domestic output. Second, the size of 𝛽𝛽 determines the relative importance
of domestic prices and exchange-rate-adjusted foreign prices in the domestic consumer price
index, given by (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽(𝑝𝑝∗ + 𝑠𝑠), where 1 − 𝛽𝛽 is the weight on expenditures on domestic
goods and 𝛽𝛽 is the weight on expenditures on foreign goods.

3. Openness and the sacrifice ratio
Because firms behave identically within each sector, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖c = 𝑦𝑦 c for all 𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 [0, 𝛺𝛺] and

𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖nc = 𝑦𝑦 nc for all𝑖𝑖 𝜖𝜖 (𝛺𝛺, 1]. It follows that 𝑦𝑦 = 𝛺𝛺𝑦𝑦 c + (1 − 𝛺𝛺)𝑦𝑦 nc . Substituting Eqs. (8) and (9) into

this expression and differentiating with respect to the aggregate price level, holding all other
variables unchanged, yields
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

=

𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 [(𝜀𝜀−𝜂𝜂 )−(1−𝛽𝛽 )]+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 (𝛼𝛼 +𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )[(𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 −𝜂𝜂 )−(1−𝛽𝛽 )(1−𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 )]
.
[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )+𝜀𝜀](𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )

(10)

This price sensitivity expression governs the short-run output-inflation trade-off. In standard
Barro-Gordon-style models, the output-inflation trade-off naturally arises as the slope of an
aggregate supply curve constructed by aggregating over the output supply curves of price7 Daniels & VanHoose

taking, perfectly competitive firms. Under imperfect competition, of course, there are no firmlevel supply curves, so there is no aggregate supply curve. The expression in Eq. (10), therefore,
is the slope of the relationship between the aggregate output produced by profit-maximizing,
price-setting firms and the overall level of prices they set. A standard positive slope emerges for
this relationship as long as 𝜀𝜀 and 𝛽𝛽 are sufficiently large (that is, the extent of domestic

competition and the degree of openness are sufficiently large) in relation to 𝜂𝜂 (the sensitivity of

desired spending on domestic output relative to the real exchange rate). Thus, given a value of
𝜂𝜂, the output-inflation trade-off is more likely to be positively sloped in an economy that is

relatively open and in which there is a reasonably large extent of rivalry among imperfectly
competitive firms.
The standard measure of openness found in the literature is the nation's propensity to
import, 𝛽𝛽, which Temple (2002) and others have used to evaluate the effects of openness on

the sacrifice ratio, under the assumption that the sacrifice ratio captures the terms of the outputinflation relationship governed by the slope of an aggregate supply schedule. Here, of course,
the output-inflation relationship arises from the aggregate responses of aggregate output across
price-setting firms given changes in their aggregate profit-maximizing prices. To determine how
an increase in 𝛽𝛽 affects the output-inflation relationship, therefore, we differentiate Eq. (10) with

respect to 𝛽𝛽 to obtain

𝜕𝜕(𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕) 𝛼𝛼{𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 + 𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)[1 + 𝜀𝜀(1 − 𝛺𝛺)]}
=
> 0.
[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) + 𝜀𝜀](𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

Thus, in our imperfectly competitive setting, an increase in the propensity to import
unambiguously increases the responsiveness of aggregate output to a change in the price level.
The reason is that greater openness makes desired spending on domestic output less sensitive
to changes in domestic income. As a result, each firm's profit-maximizing price is less
responsive to a change in aggregate domestic output. The aggregate price level is thereby less
sensitive to aggregate output changes, implying an increased sensitivity of output to a change in
the domestic price level. Thus, the model implies that greater openness improves the terms of
the output-inflation trade-off, thereby at least modestly increasing a measured sacrifice ratio for
this imperfectly competitive, multi sector, open economy.
The real-exchange-rate elasticity also affects aggregate output through labor demand
and desired expenditures, as shown in Eqs. (3) and (5). Differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to 𝜂𝜂
implies
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−𝛼𝛼[𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 + 𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)]
𝜕𝜕(𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕⁄𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕)
=
< 0.
[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) + 𝜀𝜀](𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
A larger value of 𝜂𝜂 indicates a reduction in the interdependency of the domestic and foreign

economies, moving the domestic nation toward a small open economy environment. Hence,
greater interdependence-lower values of 𝜂𝜂-makes output more sensitive to a change in the price
level, thereby yielding a higher sacrifice ratio. Moving to a small open economy environmentgreater values of 𝜂𝜂-implies a reduced responsiveness of output to price-level variations and,
consequently, a lower sacrifice ratio.

The extent of nominal wage rigidity in the economy also affects the output-inflation tradeoff. Differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to 𝛺𝛺 yields

𝜕𝜕(𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕⁄𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕) 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀[𝜀𝜀 − 𝜂𝜂 − (1 − 𝛽𝛽)] + 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼(1 − 𝛽𝛽)(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)
=
.
[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼) + 𝜀𝜀](𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

Because 0 < 𝛽𝛽 < 1 and 𝜀𝜀 > 1, this expression is positive unless 𝜂𝜂 is sufficiently large. Wage
rigidities in contract sectors affect the aggregate price level and thereby the pricing and

production decision of firms in noncontracting sectors. In an interdependent economy in which 𝜂𝜂
is relatively small, an increase in the economy-wide extent of wage contracting, as reflected in a
larger value of 𝛺𝛺, raises the sensitivity of aggregate output to price-level variations. Thus, for

most parameter configurations an increase in the extent of wage contracting raises the sacrifice
ratio. As the model approaches the limiting case of a small open economy (that is, as 𝜂𝜂 rises
toward ever-larger values), however, this effect is offset as terms-of-trade variations replace

movements in the domestic price level as the predominant factor influencing domestic spending
and, hence, aggregate output.
Finally, differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to 𝜀𝜀 indicates, in a lengthy expression that

we do not report here, that an increase in domestic competition increases the responsiveness of
aggregate output to changes in the price level. Greater substitutability across the products of the
imperfectly competitive firms reduces the pricing power available to each firm. For any given
change in the quantity of output demanded, each firm has less scope for varying its price, so
that the aggregate price level varies less in relation to any given change in output. Conversely, a
given change in output is associated with a smaller change in the price level, so that the
9 Daniels & VanHoose

measured sacrifice ratio tends to increase.

4. Openness and optimal monetary policy
In the basic Barro-Gordon model of discretionary monetary policymaking in the
presence of nominal rigidities, the operating assumption of perfect competition and a singlesector economy implies a standard aggregate supply relationship. Embedding this framework
into an open economy setting thereby implies that greater openness can be associated with
lower mean inflation only if increased openness steepens the economy's output-inflation
trade-off and thereby reduces the sacrifice ratio. This gives rise to the "puzzle" identified by
Temple: Empirical evidence indicates that while greater openness across countries is
associated with lower mean inflation rates, measured sacrifice ratios are not necessarily
inversely related to openness.
In our multisector-model environment with economy-wide monopolistic competition,
however, the relationship between aggregate output and the price level is no longer the
standard aggregate supply curve. Instead, it is a relationship between the total output of
imperfectly competitive firms and the aggregate level of prices that firms individually set in
light of the level of openness, the extent to which firms in the economy use wage contracts,
the degree of substitutability of domestic products, and the sensitivity of domestic spending to
changes in the real exchange rate. As shown above, increased openness reduces the
responsiveness of domestic spending to changes in domestic income. This induces smaller
price changes by domestic firms in response to a given variation in output, which implies a
shallower output-inflation trade-off. Thus, an analysis of inflation and openness in an
economy such as the one we have examined would be predicted to reveal a direct
relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio. Indeed, this is consistent with
empirical evidence offered by Daniels et al. (2005), who demonstrate that once one controls
for the degree of central bank independence, a positive relationship between openness and
the sacrifice ratio emerges from the same cross-country data considered by Temple (2002).
Even though our analysis indicates that greater openness improves the terms of the
output-inflation trade-off, it also implies that increased openness should affect the incentive
that the nation's central bank has to attempt to boost output via unexpected inflation.
Specifically, because greater openness reduces the responsiveness of firms' prices to a
given change in domestic output, it makes the price level less sensitive to monetary
expansions. A given expansion in the money stock, therefore, will induce less inflation and
10 Daniels & VanHoose

provide a smaller boost in real output. This, in turn, reduces the central bank's incentive to try
to engage in surprise inflations. In an imperfectly competitive multisector economy, therefore,
it should be the case that greater openness is associated with a lower trend inflation rate.
To show that this is in fact the case, we consider a central bank that aims to minimize
the policy loss function,
𝐿𝐿 = 𝐸𝐸[(𝑦𝑦 − 𝑦𝑦� − 𝐾𝐾)2 + 𝑏𝑏𝜓𝜓 2 ].

(11)

In this loss function, 𝑦𝑦� is full-information economy-wide output, which equals zero, and 𝐾𝐾 is
an output distortion, As in Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) and numerous other openeconomy versions of Barro-Gordon-style frameworks, since the propensity to import
determines the share of domestic income spent on home goods, it is also serves as the
weight on the consumer price index, so 𝜓𝜓 ≡ (1 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑝𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 is consumer price inflation under

our assumption that 𝑝𝑝∗ = 0 and with the additional simplifying assumption that 𝑝𝑝−1 = 𝑠𝑠−1 = 0.

For 𝐾𝐾 = 0, a zero-inflation policy minimizes the central bank's loss. In general, however,
𝐾𝐾 > 0, and because agents make ex ante choices without complete information, a zeroinflation monetary policy is time-inconsistent. In many versions of this Barro-Gordon

framework, a common assumption is that the inflation rate is a choice variable for the central
bank. In this model, however, the central bank determines the money stock. The equilibrium
inflation rate then adjusts endogenously as imperfectly competitive firms alter their product
prices.
In a setting with a floating exchange rate, the central bank minimizes Eq. (11) with
respect to 𝑚𝑚, taking agents' expectations of the money stock, price level, and exchange rate as
given. Using Eqs. (8), (9), and the expression for aggregate output, 𝑦𝑦 = 𝛺𝛺𝑦𝑦 c + (1 − 𝛺𝛺)𝑦𝑦 nc ,

together with Eqs. (3) and (4) yields two equations that can be solved for the ex ante equilibrium
domestic price level and exchange rate, expressed in terms of the expected price level,
expected exchange rate, and expected money stock. Together these price level and exchangerate solutions imply that the ex ante value of-the consumer price index is

𝜓𝜓 =

��𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂 +𝛼𝛼𝛽𝛽 2 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 �(𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 +𝜀𝜀)−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 (𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 +𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 )+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 𝛽𝛽 2 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (1−𝛺𝛺)�𝑚𝑚
𝜂𝜂 (𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )(𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 +𝜀𝜀)+[𝜀𝜀𝛽𝛽 2 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (1−𝛺𝛺)−𝜂𝜂(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 +𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 )]

where 𝛾𝛾 ≡ 𝛼𝛼 + 𝜀𝜀 − 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼.

�𝑛𝑛−𝛽𝛽 2 �𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 {(1−𝛽𝛽)𝑚𝑚 e +[𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 +𝜀𝜀−(1−𝛽𝛽)]𝑝𝑝 e }
,
𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 (1−𝛺𝛺)−𝜂𝜂(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀 +𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 )]

+ 𝜂𝜂 (𝛾𝛾+𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )(𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 +𝜀𝜀)+[𝜀𝜀𝛽𝛽 2

Substituting Eq. (12) and the expression for aggregate output into Eq. (11) and
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(12)

differentiating with respect to 𝑚𝑚, given 𝑚𝑚e , 𝑝𝑝e , and 𝑠𝑠 e , yields the first-order condition for optimal

monetary policy. Under rational expectations and in the presumed absence of disturbances, it

must be true ex post that 𝑚𝑚e = 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑝𝑝e = 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑠𝑠 e , which then yields the inflation bias of
discretionary monetary policy:

𝑚𝑚 = 𝜓𝜓 =

𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 [𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )+𝜀𝜀]𝐾𝐾
.
𝑏𝑏{𝜂𝜂 (𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )+𝜀𝜀]−𝛼𝛼(𝜂𝜂−𝜀𝜀𝛽𝛽 2 )[𝜆𝜆(𝛼𝛼+𝜀𝜀−𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 )+𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 ]}

(13)

As in standard time-inconsistency models of the Barro-Gordon variety, a decrease in 𝑏𝑏, the

weight that the monetary authority places on inflation in the loss function, boosts the inflation
bias. So does an increase in 𝐾𝐾, the wedge between full-information output and the monetary

authority's target output level.

In an open economy with imperfectly competitive firms, the inflation bias also depends
on other factors, including the amount of economy-wide wage rigidity, the elasticity of
expenditures with respect to the real exchange rate, the degree of openness, and the extent of
product substitutability. An increase in economy-wide wage rigidity resulting from an increase in
the portion of sectors with contracts, 𝛺𝛺 magnifies the scope of the time-inconsistency problem

and thereby pushes up the inflation bias. Naturally, if there are no sectors with wage contracts,
so that 𝛺𝛺 = 0, the time-inconsistency problem disappears, and 𝜓𝜓 = 𝑂𝑂.

The effect of an increase in the real-exchange-rate elasticity on the inflation bias is given

by
𝛼𝛼𝜀𝜀 2 𝛽𝛽 2 𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺(𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾)(𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾 + 𝜀𝜀)
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
=
> 0.
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑏𝑏[𝜂𝜂𝜂𝜂(𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 + 𝜀𝜀) − 𝛼𝛼(𝜂𝜂 − 𝜀𝜀𝛽𝛽 2 )(𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆 + 𝛺𝛺𝛺𝛺)]2
If the sensitivity of desired domestic spending with respect to the real exchange rate
increases, then variations in the terms-of-trade have larger effects on output. This gives the
monetary authority a greater incentive to boost the domestic money stock in order to bring about
a real depreciation of the domestic currency. Thus, a higher value of 𝜂𝜂 increases the inflation
bias, ceteris paribus, even though a rise in 𝜂𝜂 reduces the sacrifice ratio.

Both the degree of openness and the extent of product substitutability also affect the

inflation bias. It follows directly from Eq. (13) that (𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕/𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕) < 0 is the relevant outcome for a

typical open economy. Consequently, increased openness tends to reduce the inflationary bias
of discretionary monetary policy, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. As noted
12 Daniels & VanHoose

earlier, it is theoretically feasible for the output-inflation trade-off to slope downward for
sufficiently small values of 𝜀𝜀. This contributes to the potential for the inflation bias to respond

ambiguously to an increase in the extent of substitutability of products. For the relatively larger
range of values of 𝜀𝜀 consistent with an upward-sloping output-inflation trade-off, however, it is
straight-forward to show that a higher value of 𝜀𝜀 reduces the inflation bias. In general, both

greater product substitutability and increased openness diminish the pricing power of domestic
firms and thereby reduce the degree to which a given monetary expansion can raise output via
unexpected increases in the domestic price level.

5. Conclusion
The upshot of our analysis is the prediction that greater openness increases the sacrifice
ratio while reducing the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary policy in an imperfectly
competitive open economy in which nominal wages are set in advance of price and output
determination in some sectors but not in others. Thus, observation of a positive correlation
between openness and the sacrifice ratio even in the presence of an inverse relationship
between openness and mean inflation is consistent with the results of our analysis.
Temple's contribution raises important questions about the relationship between the
sacrifice ratio and mean inflation. Our analysis implies that his findings could result in part from
cross-country differences in the extent of wage rigidity, in the degree of product substitutability,
and in the sensitivity of aggregate expenditures with respect to the real exchange rate. Work by
Ghosal and Loungani (1996) and Duca and VanHoose (1998, 2001) indicates that a multisector
environment in which only a portion of firms negotiate nominal wage contracts may be relevant
in the United States. For the United States and certain other nations that may fit this mold, our
model predicts that there is more likely to be a positive observed relationship between openness
and the measured sacrifice ratio, even though increased openness leads to a lower inflation
bias. This result would be strengthened if we were to follow Karras (1999) by including the
potential for indexation of wages to the consumer price index, although in our imperfectcompetition framework this would introduce a source of potential ambiguity concerning the
theoretical effect of openness on trend inflation.
In other countries, a combination of significant international interdependence (a relatively
low value of 𝜂𝜂 in our model), extensive substitutability among products (a relatively large value
of 𝜀𝜀), and considerable economy-wide wage rigidity (a value of 𝛺𝛺 relatively near unity) would
tend to make the standard Barro-Gordon model more applicable. In our model, creating a
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negative relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio in the case in which 𝜂𝜂 → 0, 𝜀𝜀 →

∞, and 𝛺𝛺 → 1 requires including other international linkages not incorporated into the structural
framework. Romer (1993), for instance, highlights ways in which openness might increase the

responsiveness of domestic firms' input costs to changes in the consumer price index, thereby
reducing the sacrifice ratio within a purely competitive setting.
These considerations imply that empirical tests using cross-country or pooled
international data to evaluate the implications of increased openness for sacrifice ratios, trend
inflation, or other macroeconomic policy variables could be subject to misspecification problems.
The effects of openness on both the slope of a nation's output-inflation trade-off and the
responsiveness of its price level to monetary expansions can depend crucially on structural
factors. For instance, our analysis identifies the real-exchange-rate sensitivity of its aggregate
expenditures, the competitive structure of its product markets, and the nature of its labor-market
arrangements-which are just a subset of structural factors highlighted as potentially important in
the new open economy macroeconomics literature.
Consistent with the implications of the new open economy macroeconomics literature,
our analysis indicates the potential for pitfalls in otherwise very carefully done empirical work
that nonetheless does not take into account important structural differences across economies.
For instance, cross-country comparisons or panel studies using pooled country data could yield
results about the interactions among, openness, the sacrifice ratio, and trend inflation that are
difficult to interpret in the absence of efforts to control for structural differences among nations.
Daniels et al. (2005), for instance, demonstrate that controlling for just one other structural factor
in cross-country data-namely, central bank independence-is sufficient to uncover the positive
relationship between openness and the sacrifice ratio predicted by our model.
Our conclusion, therefore, is that failure to find apparent evidence of a negative
relationship between the sacrifice ratio and mean inflation does not necessarily cast doubt on
the relevance s of the time-inconsistency approach as an explanation for the openness-inflation
relationship. Although our analysis and preceding work uniformly indicate that increased
openness should reduce mean inflation, our results imply that how openness and the sacrifice
ratio interact depends fundamentally on the structures of nations' goods and labor markets.
Future empirical work should extend the work of Temple and Karras by focusing on the potential
roles of various structural factors, such as national differences in the extent of aggregate wage
rigidity, the scope of product substitutability, the real-exchange-rate sensitivity of domestic
spending, the degree of central bank independence, and, based on Gruben and McLeod (2002,
14 Daniels & VanHoose

2004), the extent of capital market liberalization. In open economies with imperfectly competitive
product markets, all of these factors are likely to influence the relationship among openness, the
sacrifice ratio, and inflation.
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